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WHAT’S IN A NAME OR, BETTER YET, WHAT’S IT WORTH?: CITIES,
SPORTS TEAMS AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
By
Mitchell Nathanson∗
ABSTRACT:
This article examines the harm that accompanies real and threatened in-market
relocations of professional sports teams and proposes a federal statutory remedy that will
protect the interest of city residents given the reality that city governments have
demonstrated their inability to adequately protect their electorate through contract law
alone. Although, as this article discusses, there have been myriad bills proposed by
Congress in response to several high profile out-of-market sports franchise relocations
(mostly those involving NFL teams and mostly during the 1990’s), in-market relocations
have historically occurred much more frequently, inflicting similar harms to the spurned
city residents. Moreover, as this article shows, these harms accrue even when these
franchises ultimately decide to remain within the boundaries of their urban bases; it is the
mere threat and resulting relocation negotiations pitting city against nearby suburb, each
hoping to curry the local team’s favor, that cause damage. As in-market relocations are
likely to become even more prevalent in the future, this article contends that legislation is
needed. This article concludes that amending the federal Lanham Act by providing cities
with a limited property right -- a right of publicity -- in their names will cure many of
these ills. By commodifying the names of cities, the true costs of in-market relocations
will be felt by teams that, as of now, are free to relocate at their whim, taking advantage
of superior lease terms offered by suburban political entities while at the same time
benefiting from the affiliation with the cities they have spurned. A federally created right
of publicity would prevent such actions or, at a minimum, compel sports franchises to
pay for the right to associate with a city in which it no longer plays if it wishes to reap the
attendant benefits of the association.
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 8, 2006, in a scene repeated dozens of times across the United
States over the past several decades, the NFL’s San Francisco 49’ers announced that
because they were unable to come to terms with the city in which they played for the
construction of a new stadium, they had no choice but to relocate.1 Having spurned San
Francisco, their home since 1946, they now set their sights upon Santa Clara, a logical
choice given that the team’s headquarters and practice facility had been located there
∗
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since 1987. Although Santa Clara is approximately 45 miles and, depending upon the
fickle Bay Area traffic, at least an hour’s drive from San Francisco, the 49’ers likewise
announced on that date that they intended to keep the San Francisco name.2 This too was
not unusual as several teams in all four major professional sports leagues (Major League
Baseball, the National Football League, the National Basketball League and the National
Hockey League) play their home games in geographical locations other than the ones
emblazoned on their uniform tops: the NFL’s Dallas Cowboys play in Irving, Texas;
MLB’s Tampa Bay Devil Rays in St. Petersburg, Florida; The NBA’s Detroit Pistons in
Auburn Hills, Michigan, and the NHL’s Phoenix Coyotes in Glendale, Arizona, to name
but a few. What was unusual was the reaction of the city of San Francisco to this
announcement: it strongly objected to the continuation of this practice as far as the 49’ers
were concerned.3 Across the San Francisco bay, baseball’s Oakland A’s were in the
midst of a similar relocation: they too were abandoning the city and stadium they called
home for decades and were adamant upon relocating in Fremont, a 27 mile, half hour
drive away.4 And like the 49’ers, the A’s as well intended on keeping their Oakland
affiliation.
400 miles to the south, in Anaheim, a somewhat different but fundamentally
similar battle between city and team over the geographical designation of a sports team’s
2
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name had recently concluded with the city of Anaheim ultimately unable to prevent
Anaheim Angels’ owner Arturo Moreno from rechristening his Anaheim Angels baseball
team the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim – a mouthful, to say the least.5 The Anaheim
legal battle, discussed in detail below, foretells the future of the San Francisco and
Oakland scrums should either city decide to press its demand to prevent the relocating
49’ers and A’s from using their geographical identifiers without their permission. For as
the law currently stands, “[p]retty much whatever a team wants to call itself, it can.”6
Without a change in the law, San Francisco is powerless to stop the 49’ers, or anyone else
for that matter, from using its name, for its benefit, without the city’s permission.

Thus,

as it presently stands, the cities of Oakland, San Francisco and Anaheim, as well as Los
Angeles which likewise had its name appropriated in the Angels litigation, are without a
remedy. Their names are free and available to any professional sports team seeking to
profit from the association with the market and image they represent. This article asks
whether this represents unjust enrichment and whether Congress should step in and
protect what may very well be a property right that has gone, up to now, unprotected: the
limited right of a city to its name.
This article analyzes the motivations by professional sports teams behind inmarket moves such as the ones contemplated by the 49’ers and A’s, and shows that,
contrary to popular assumption, such moves are not benign; in fact they involve harm to
any city at the mercy of the sports team contemplating such a relocation. In fact, inmarket relocations, regardless of whether they are consummated or merely threatened,
invariably result in the very same improper benefits to sports franchises that are decried
5
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whenever a team moves out-of-market for the greener pastures (and below market rents
and above-market benefits) of a far away city. Because, due to changing demographics
and economic developments in professional sports, in-market relocations are likely to
become only more common in the future as they represent to many teams their best
option in their eternal quest to maximize revenue by squeezing as much money from
public sources as possible, such harm may need to be addressed and remedied. This
article examines the playing field, so to speak, upon which the negotiations between
professional sports team and city (or political subdivision) take place and concludes that,
because cities do not own the rights to the use of their names, the field is invariably and
improperly tilted in favor of the teams, with the result being corporate welfare far and
above what cities would have had to concede if only the field were level. Accordingly,
Congress may have an interest in stepping in and remedying the imbalance. As for the
nature of this remedy, this article proposes an exception to the Lanham Act that would
grant cities a limited quasi-property right – a right of publicity – not unlike the right
Congress created in its 1999 Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act (“ACPA”)7 wherein it
granted individuals, in effect, similar rights within the limited context of registered
Internet domain names. As the granting of this similarly limited and circumscribed right
would have the effect of equalizing the bargaining power of cities and the professional
sports franchises seeking to profit off of the use of their names, it would pave the way for
stadium leases between city and team that more accurately reflect and represent the
interests of both parties.
II. THE RE-CHRISTENING OF THE LOS ANGELES ANGELS OF ANAHEIM
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In 1996, the Anaheim Angels were bought by the Walt Disney Company, which
likewise operated Disneyland within the city limits of Anaheim.8 At the time of the
purchase, the city of Anaheim entered into a lease with Disney for the use of Anaheim’s
stadium. Pursuant to the lease, the city agreed to fund $30 million of the approximately
$100 million cost of renovating the aging stadium in exchange for a lease provision that
stipulated that the Angels keep the Anaheim designation for the duration of the contract.9
In 2003, however, Disney sold the Angels to Moreno for approximately $180 million.10
With such a significant investment in the team, Moreno sought to maximize his return.
Very quickly, he realized the financial significance of the geographical identification of
his team and recognized that some identities were more valuable than others. In his case,
he had purchased a Major League Baseball team with the unfortunate geographic
designation of Anaheim. If only his Angels were identified with Los Angeles instead,
they would be worth so much more. For proof of this assertion, Moreno had to look no
further than his local television contract. Even though the Angels were the 2002 World
Series Champions while the Dodgers had not even played in a World Series since 1988,
even though both teams recorded identical viewership shares, and even though both
teams had maintained a Southern California presence for nearly half a century (the
Dodgers arrived in 1958; the Angels a mere three years later in 1961), the best television
deal the Angels could wring from local station KCAL was one worth $5.5 million; the

8

See City of Anaheim.
Id.
10
Laura M. Holson, Disney Reaches a Deal For the Sale of the Angels, New York Times, April 16, 2003,
at S3.
9

5

Dodgers received a $10 million deal from the same station.11 Clearly, the Los Angeles
designation was more valuable than the Anaheim one.
Given this reality, Moreno promptly ignored the contract his predecessors signed
with Anaheim and rechristened his team the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, hoping to
benefit from the association with the larger Los Angeles market.12 Although the city of
Anaheim protested, sued and sought a preliminary injunction forbidding the name
change, alleging that the change caused irreparable harm to the city by relegating it to
second-class status and damaging local pride, Moreno prevailed despite a contract that
seemingly protected Anaheim’s interests.13 By the close of the 2005 baseball season, the
name change became permanent. In the end, Anaheim was powerless to protect and
control the use of its name. Although not a party to the suit, the city of Los Angeles
likewise was given no say in the use of its name for the financial benefit of Moreno and
his Angels. There is no indication that its interest in the litigation was even considered.
Aware of the reality demonstrated in the Angels litigation but nevertheless realizing that
it “feels a bit of a rip-off” for a team such as the 49’ers to relocate but continue to reap
the benefits of the San Francisco name, a local assemblyman introduced a bill into the
California legislature that would make such a practice illegal unless the mayor and Board
of Supervisors of the abandoned city authorized such use.14 This came on the heels of
Assembly Bill 1041, introduced by an Anaheim assemblyman in response to the Angels
litigation, that would have required a team named for a city where it does not play to
11
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disclose that fact on tickets and promotional material.15 Although both bills are noble in
their aims, both are doomed in their effect: because they conflict with federal trademark
law, specifically, the Lanham Act (the “San Francisco 49’ers,” as are all professional
sports team names, is a registered trademark owned by team itself),16 any proposed state
law would invariably conflict with it and, as such, would be destined for failure.
Although the specifics of the Angels litigation certainly were unusual, the
supposedly minor, benign, in-market relocation desires of both the 49’ers and A’s just as
certainly are not. Relocation, or, more accurately, threatened relocation, has been a way
of life in major professional sports for more than half a century. Between 1950 and 1998
there were 68 relocations in the four major sports – with the vast majority of these being
in-market relocations.17 Between 1990 and 2000, there were 77 major league facility
lease re-negotiations, modernizations or newly constructed stadium in these sports.18
And between 2000 and 2005, an additional 21 stadiums were built for teams in these four
leagues.19 The overwhelming majority of these relocations, new stadiums and lease renegotiations were the result of in-market maneuvering in which a team, like the NFL’s
49’ers or MLB’s A’s, sought to improve its leverage by threatening relocation, very often
no further than across the nearest river or city limit. The dynamics of such a scenario are
amazingly simple and predictable: inevitably, a bidding war between city and suburb
ensues with the team needing to do little more than sit back and fan the competitive
15
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flames between its potential suitors. Eventually, a new deal is consummated with the
team either relocating across the city limit or remaining within the city. Under either
scenario, the new lease terms are invariably one-sided, inuring solely to the benefit of the
team and at the expense of local taxpayers. Although, to date, commentators and
members of Congress have largely ignored these ever-increasing political ballets, perhaps
it is time they paid attention. The resulting harms are very real and oftentimes
devastating.
III. RELOCATION DESIRES AND RESPONSES
Traditionally, it has been the out-of-market relocation that has drawn the attention
of both Congress and commentators, although not to the extent that anything much has
been done about it. The costs and benefits of such moves have been widely debated and
although several bills have been proposed to curb the practice, none have ever garnered
enough support to pass into law. The impetus for relocation as well as the bills proposed
in response to the flurry of out-of-market relocations in the NFL in the mid 1990’s are
discussed below.
A. Why Teams Move
In each of the four major sports leagues, teams are granted exclusive geographic
territories in which to operate.20 In the NFL, for example, eastern Pennsylvania, southern
New Jersey and northern Delaware mark the exclusive territory of the Philadelphia
Eagles. The Baltimore Ravens cannot encroach from the south, the Pittsburgh Steelers
cannot encroach from the west and the New York Giants and Jets cannot encroach from
the north, absent permission from the NFL. In theory, this absence of competition should
20
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ensure that each team thrives within its geographic region and would never seek to
relocate. In practice, it has not worked out this way, for while teams and their leagues do
indeed benefit from geographic exclusivity, they learned long ago that they can benefit
even more by using it to their advantage.21 The logic is simple: in order to maximize
profit, professional sports leagues must expand quickly enough to deter the formation of
rival leagues that would create a market and hence, undercut profitability, but slowly
enough to ensure that there remain “viable, vacant locations to which existing teams
could move.”22 According to at least some economists, two to four potential markets
appears to be the ideal number.23 The presence of these available markets forces a team’s
home city to take relocation threats seriously and results in the bidding war hoped-for by
the team seeking to improve its lease. In this game, the team cannot help but win: either
it relocates to the city offering the most lucrative deal (one that is far and away superior
to the team’s present lease) or it remains and benefits through either a renegotiated lease
or a renovated or new stadium, with either alternative a marked improvement over its
current deal. By engaging multiple cities in a competitive bidding process for it, the team
emerges victorious regardless.
Cities, by contrast, do not enjoy similar negotiating advantages. Geographic
exclusivity puts them at a disadvantage in that, by definition, they are unable to negotiate
with more than one team at a time. Given the extremely limited uses of large sports
facilities and given the monopoly power of sports leagues to limit competition within

21
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geographic regions, cities are left vulnerable at the bargaining table, with no other
recourse than to outbid potentially several other cities by offering up sub-market rents
and above-market perks if they hope to retain their teams.24 In this way, “[a] sports
franchise can extract a monopoly price from a community by insisting on millions of
dollars of publicly financed subsidies, such as reduced rental fees, playing facility or
infrastructure improvements, or new arenas and stadiums.”25 Given this reality, it is little
wonder why teams seek to relocate despite the apparent perks of geographic exclusivity.
A few recent examples illustrate the extent to which teams benefit from their
superior bargaining positions. In the NFL, the city of St. Louis, which had been without
a team ever since its Cardinals relocated to Phoenix in 1988, was determined to outbid its
rivals in order to secure the Rams, who had made it clear that they were unsatisfied with
their lease arrangement in Anaheim. With several cities vying for the franchise, St. Louis
offered up the key to its city and then some, promising to turn over to the team 75% of all
advertising revenue from its newly constructed domed stadium (paid for, at a cost of
$300 million, primarily with public funds), personal seat license revenue of $74 million,
luxury seat revenue, and $1.3 million per year in naming rights.26 In exchange, the city
and state of Missouri kept for themselves all of $250,000 per year in ticket sales and $1
million per year in taxes based upon attendance.27 If all of this were not enough, the city
agreed to include in its lease an opt-out clause which would allow the Rams to void the
agreement and relocate without penalty if the stadium was not ranked in the top 25% of

24
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all NFL stadiums.28 Finally, when a snafu between the NFL and Rams emerged over the
league’s insistence that the Rams pay a $29 million league-mandated relocation fee, the
city agreed to pay $20 million of this.29 In all, by one estimate, as a result of this
arrangement the city and state receive no more than 10% each year of what they spend on
the stadium.30 Clearly, St. Louis’s lack of bargaining power contributed to this
overwhelmingly one-sided deal.31
The St. Louis deal is typical of the types of arrangements reached between public
entity and professional sports franchise due to the inequality of bargaining power. In
Baltimore, the city, seeking to replace the NFL’s Colts who relocated to Indianapolis
years earlier, agreed to fund 100% of a new, $200 million football stadium in order to
entice the Cleveland Browns to relocate.32 In addition, it offered the team free rent as
well as 100% of all luxury box, parking and stadium advertising revenue.33 Publicly
funded stadiums, offered up at little or no cost to teams, are a common carrot used to lure
opportunity-sniffing franchises. In 1990, the city of St. Petersburg, Florida built a $138
million stadium in the hopes of luring either the Chicago White Sox or San Francisco
Giants to town.34 Neither team took the bait, choosing instead to use the new stadium in
St. Pete as a chip in which to negotiate superior lease agreements with their home towns
instead. As a result, the cities of Chicago and San Francisco soon helped to finance the
construction of new homes for their teams. The impetus for publicly funded stadiums
was perhaps best summarized by Arlington, Texas mayor Richard E. Greene, who
28
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justified his support for a new stadium for his city’s Rangers by stating that “[y]ou don’t
build a stadium because the rich owners and the millionaire players need the
money…[y]ou do it because other communities are willing to do it.”35
B. How Cities Justify the Expenditure of Public Funds for Professional
Sports Stadiums
Mayor Greene’s sober analysis aside, many cities have attempted to justify their
leap into bed with professional sports teams on various economic and non-economic
grounds. Upon closer inspection, these claims appear to be specious.
i.

Economic Benefits

In Arlington, a consulting/accounting firm hired to study the feasibility of the
proposed stadium concluded that new stadium would create 5100 jobs and $140 million
of new money in the city of Arlington the first year the stadium was operational.36 In
Cincinnati, an economic impact study commissioned by Hamilton County and done by
the University of Cincinnati concluded that the construction of two new stadiums would
bring a one-time economic benefit of $1.3 billion to the county and that the total
economic impact of both the NFL’s Bengals and MLB’s Reds playing in new stadiums
would be $296 million along with the creation of 6883 jobs.37 In northern Virginia, the
1996 Final Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Financing Options for the Purpose
of Constructing a Baseball Stadium in Virginia concluded that such a stadium would add
$137 million to the Virginia economy, create 1000 jobs and result in $32 million in new

35
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wages.38 These projections are typical. Many cities considering the construction of new
stadiums have trumpeted similar public benefits. David Lonergan, who has been vocal in
his support of publicly funded stadiums and whose company specializes in stadium
funding alternatives, stated that he believes that for every $1 spent on professional sports,
household income raises $.17 and that an additional $1.75 is pumped into the economy.39
It is for these reasons that some public officials believe (or at least tout) that stadium
construction is in the public interest in that it supposedly jumpstarts the local economy
and can actually revive dying communities.40
These claims have been repeatedly studied and found to be without merit,
however. As stated by economist Andrew Zimbalist, “[f]ew fields of empirical economic
research offer virtual unanimity of findings. Yet, independent work on the economic
impact of stadiums and arenas has uniformly found that there is no statistically significant
positive correlation between sports facility construction and economic development.”41
By way of but one example, a 1997 study conducted by the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) found that of the 30 stadium projects considered in the study, 27 had no
discernable economic impact on the community and three had, of all things, a negative
impact.42 Baltimore’s stadium building experience is typical: the CRS found that its
newly constructed football stadium did indeed create jobs, albeit at a cost of $127,000 per
position -- more than 21 times the $6,250 it cost to create each new job through
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Maryland’s general economic development fund.43 Overall, stadium construction
resulted in a negative economic impact upon the community given the diversion of
economic resources.44 Its baseball stadium, long hailed as an economic success story,
produced similar dubious benefits. A mid-1990’s study of Oriole Park at Camden Yards
found that it generated approximately $3 million annually but at a cost of $14 million to
Maryland taxpayers.45
Far from the claims made on behalf of professional sports franchises, they very
often have little or no impact on local economies because, despite the proliferation of
media coverage they generate and the overwhelming role these teams play in popular
culture, comparatively speaking, they are surprisingly small enterprises. One economist,
who has studied the interrelationship between sports and local economies since 1987, has
concluded that, on the whole, “hosting a franchise has less economic impact on a city in
terms of direct revenue and employment than attracting a medium-sized department
store.”46 The numbers bear this out: most teams employ approximately 70-130 people in
their front offices and hire another 1000-1500 day-of-game personnel who perform
unskilled, temporary work for low hourly wages.47 Zimbalist concluded, generously, that
for a typical NFL team playing 10 home games per season, the cumulative annual effect
of day-of-game employment was the equivalent of perhaps 20-30 full time, year-round
43
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jobs at best.48 Accordingly, the impact of these businesses is negligible: for a mediumsized city such as St. Louis, Zimbalist concluded that its baseball team accounts for less
than .3% of local economic activity.49 Larger cities such as New York feel even less
impact from their teams: a baseball team in Gotham contributes less than .03% to the
city’s economy.50 Moreover, whatever low-paying jobs are created typically do not help
to jump start the economy as low-paying jobs tend to follow high-paying jobs and not
vice-versa.51 Thus, the benefit of these temporary jobs extends no further than the limited
benefits offered by these jobs themselves; they do not stimulate growth and do not lead to
other, more stable jobs – jobs complete with benefits and stability that would indeed help
to grow the local economy.
Opportunity costs further erode the impact of stadium construction as well as
consumer dollars spent on professional sports entertainment. Public spending on
construction means that less public money is spent on other projects such as parks, public
buildings and infrastructure improvements that likewise would promote the image of the
city and act as a public good.52 In addition, consumer spending on sports entertainment
results in less spending on other forms of entertainment.53 The net result of all this is
that, at best, spending on professional sports represents a shift in resources and not the
creation of new ones.54 From the city’s perspective, this shift is not without risk in that
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the debt created by the use of public funds on projects that generate such little economic
impact may affect the city’s credit rating with the result being that, in the future, it would
have to pay a higher interest rate on future loans.55 In the end, the city’s taxpayers bear
the brunt of the city’s urge to attract or retain a professional sports team at any cost.
In sum, the existence of professional sports teams does little to bolster a city’s
economy despite loud claims to the contrary. Worse, many professional sports stadiums
are such bad deals for cities that one economist, Roger Noll of Stanford, concluded that
cities which build them should expect to suffer losses of $20-25 million annually.56 To
all of the team owners who argue otherwise, professor Noll provides the most basic and
obvious retort: if these stadiums were the surefire economic goldmines their supporters
claim them to be, they would build them themselves.57 That they don’t, that they instead
look to public entities to foot the bill (and therefore take some of the revenue), says all
anyone needs to know regarding their profitability.
ii.

Non-Economic Benefits

Supporters of professional sports team stadium construction likewise tout the noneconomic benefits that allegedly flow from these projects. Like the economic claims,
these too appear to be specious upon examination.
Proponents of a new baseball stadium in St. Louis urged the passage of a bill
funding construction for it by claiming that keeping the Cardinals in the city would save
it from irrelevance. State Senate President pro tempore Peter Kinder stated that “the
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survival of the City of St. Louis is on the line. I don’t think St. Louis would be much
without the Cardinals.”58 Without its professional sports teams, Kinder believed that St.
Louis “would risk becoming another big Omaha.”59 This claim is typical as the “big
league” image of a given city is often believed to be the result of the presence of the
professional sports teams that call it their home.60 In Charlotte, for example, its Chamber
of Commerce vice president pointed to the arrival of new NBA, NHL and NFL teams in
the 1990’s as the lynchpin for the city’s national image makeover: “Charlotte was in a
situation where it was an unheard of community 10 years ago,” he said. “With
professional sports, we’ve gone a long way towards getting known.”61 In short, “big
league” cities play host to “big league” teams, or so the theory goes. In the never ending
competition between and among cities (defined as “Homeric” and worthy of Freudian
analysis according to one commentator), cities with major league teams consider
themselves superior to those without them; referring to such outposts as “backwaters” or
“second-tier” communities.62 Although this might seem silly and even though the
economic impact of these teams is negligible, these feelings are, in the words of the same
commentator, “nonetheless real.”63 Cities, just like the teams that call them their home,
compete and use these teams as the basis for their competition. As such, the emotional
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stakes are high indeed and any advantage is one worth considering, regardless of its
financial impact.
Beyond competitive advantages, supporters of stadium construction sometimes
tout the “renewed civic pride” resulting from the gleaming new edifices.64 Increased
opportunities to promote the city as a tourist destination and even improved racial
harmony have also been cited as justifications.65 However, all of this could just as easily
be achieved by means other than the construction of costly and economically inefficient
stadiums. Improved police protection, well-tended parks and other public buildings
would likewise raise civic pride and render the city more attractive to outsiders. To the
extent that these improvements are foregone due to the shifting of limited resources to
stadium construction, it is difficult to conclude that a city is better off merely because a
new stadium is built.66 Once again, opportunity costs must be factored into the equation.
iii.

The Clear Beneficiaries of Stadium Construction.

While the public benefits of stadium construction are dubious to say the least, the
benefits to sports franchise owners are not. Stadium construction puts money in their
pockets quickly and in more than one way. First and most directly, franchises see an
immediate increase in operating revenue as a result of new and improved streams of
revenue that flow from the new stadium – revenue created by the below-market rents and
above-market perks received as a result of the competition between communities to
secure the team.67 Second, the value of franchises also seems to rise as a result of the
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new facilities. By way of three representative examples, the Baltimore Orioles were sold
in 1988 while they played in decaying Memorial Stadium for $70 million. Five years
later, and one year after moving into Oriole Park at Camden Yards, they were sold again,
this time for $173 million.68 In Texas, the Rangers were sold in 1989 for $46 million and
resold in 1998 for five times that amount, $250 million, with the team’s glimmering new
stadium cited as the primary reason for the team’s rapid increase in value.69 In the NFL,
the Cleveland Browns, playing in Cleveland’s Memorial Stadium, were estimated to be
worth $160 million in 1995 but $200 million two years later when they moved into a
brand new stadium in Baltimore.70 Given that, without exception, cities have borne the
brunt of the costs while franchises have reaped the majority of the benefits that flow from
stadium construction, more than one commentator has concluded that cities are clearly
unable to adequately protect the interests of their taxpayers solely by contract.71 In this
atmosphere, teams have an interest in maintaining so-called franchise free agency
because, as the above has illustrated, it allows them to maximize revenue and reduce
costs, both of which ultimately increase profitability.
Although arguably, the four major sports leagues have the ability to control
franchise free agency through league bylaws which mandate majority or super-majority
approval by league members before any particular relocation is permitted, historically
they have demonstrated that they are unwilling or unable to police themselves. Between
1950 and 1982, 78 franchises relocated with leagues throwing up roadblocks only when
personal vendettas, rather than the protection of individual communities, appeared to be
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involved.72 Major League Baseball has stepped in to prevent relocation by maverick
owners such as Bill Veeck and Charles O. Finley; the National Football League
attempted to thwart renegade owner Al Davis from moving his Raiders from Oakland to
Los Angeles.73 Other than attempts to even a personal score, however, these leagues,
along with the NBA and NHL have rarely acted with zeal to protect a city’s best interest
or fans by thwarting relocation. Although the 9th Circuit’s 1984 opinion in Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum v. National Football League (commonly referred to as Raiders I)74
may have shed doubt on at least the NFL’s ability to control relocation through its
bylaws,75 in practice the decision made little difference; most leagues were not using this
power anyway.
The imbalance of power between team and city has only been amplified in recent
decades as start-up costs for new leagues have skyrocketed to the point where today there
is little threat of new teams from rival leagues potentially entering existing markets and
providing the host city with at least some negotiating leverage.76 Given the
overwhelming costs involved in starting a rival major league caliber baseball, football
basketball or hockey league and the small chance of success, the four leagues that
currently exist are now more assured than ever that there will be no outside challengers
competing for a given city’s resources. As such, the teams in these established leagues
can confidently maximize their monopoly power through the exercise of geographic
72
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exclusivity, allowing them to exert ever more pressure on cities to squeeze out submarket rents and above-market perks.77 Quite simply, without these teams, cities have
nowhere else to turn for top-tier professional sports in their markets.
Because of this, Congress has attempted, amid much criticism, to insert itself into
the equation on several different occasions in order to level the playing field. Much of
the criticism has labeled such attempts by Congress as “protectionist measure[s] that fl[y]
in the face of the American ideal of competitive markets, open markets and a free market
economy.”78 Although such criticism glosses over, or simply ignores, the abusive
monopoly power on one side of the bargaining table and the helplessness, as a result of
league-imposed and Congressional approved geographic exclusivity, on the other, it has
been effective in thwarting several popularly supported bills that have been introduced in
both houses of Congress within the past decade and a half. The following section
reviews the genesis of these bills and the reasons for their failure.
C. Proposed Congressional Legislation
Without exception, all of the proposed legislation focused on the harms caused by
out-of-market relocation, i.e., teams moving from one exclusive geographic region to
another (such as the Colts’ 1980’s relocation from Baltimore to Indianapolis), rather than
in-market relocation, i.e., teams relocating within their existing exclusive geographic
regions (such as the 1970’s relocation of the New York Giants from New York City to
East Rutherford, New Jersey). After the uncertainty created by 9th Circuit’s Raiders I
decision, Congress attempted on several occasions, prompted by the relocation or
threatened relocation of various NFL teams which took advantage of the decision to
77
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exercise their seemingly unfettered right to threaten relocation unless new stadiums were
built for them, to make such moves less attractive by withholding federal money for the
construction of these stadiums unless certain conditions were met.79 None, however,
were passed into law.
The first such bill was 1992’s Professional Sports Franchise Stabilization Act,
which would have required franchises to negotiate in good faith with their local
governments before they could seek to relocate elsewhere.80 Only when the local
government demonstrated an unwillingness to address the inadequacies pinpointed by the
franchise would relocation be permitted. In essence, this bill provided a quasi “right of
first refusal” to the home city.81 Three years later, The Fans Right Act of 1995 was
proposed which differed from the Professional Sports Franchise Stabilization Act in that
it called for an antitrust exemption for the NFL, NBA and NHL that would overrule
Raiders I and permit these leagues to restrict the mobility of their franchises (Major
League Baseball was not included in the Act due to its existing antitrust exemption
stemming from the Supreme Court’s 1922 opinion in Federal Base Ball Club of
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs82).83 Following these
were a litany of other bills such as the Fans Rights Act of 1995,84 the Fan Freedom and
Community Protection Act of 1995,85 The Fan Freedom and Community Protection Act

79

See Alvin B. Lindsay, Note, Our Team, Our Name, Our Colors: The Trademark Rights of Cities in Team
Name Ownership, 21 Whittier L. Rev. 915, 932 (2000).
80
See Michele Cotrupe, Note, Curbing Franchise Free Agency: The Professional Sports Franchise
Relocation Act of 1998, 9 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. 165, 174-75 (1998).
81
Id.
82
259 U.S. 200 (1922).
83
See Lindsay, Our Team, Our Name, Our Colors, at 933-34.
84
S. 1439, 104th Cong. (1995).
85
H.R. 2740, 104th Cong. (1995).

22

of 1996,86 the Professional Sports Antitrust Clarification Act of 1996,87 the Sports
Relocation Reform Act of 1996,88 the Sports Antitrust Reform Act of 1996,89 the Stop
Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act (STADIA),90 the Team Relocation Taxpayers
Protection Act of 1996,91 the Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1998,92 and
the Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999.93 Most of these bills were
similar in that they proposed an antitrust exemption for the NFL, NBA and NHL; some
also linked the receipt of federal dollars for stadium construction to a franchise’s
exhaustion of effort to remain within its current geographic region. Only after several
conditions had been met, such as notice to the local government of an intent to relocate
and good faith negotiations thereafter, would federal dollars be made available under
these bills for stadium construction.
The Fan Freedom and Community Protection Act of 1995 (FFCPA) was notable
for a provision that stated that, should a team relocate, its registered mark would become
the property of its league.94 Thereafter, the league would reserve the mark for the
community which lost its team until either the mark expired or the community notified
the league that it did not intend to use it.95 Under another provision of the bill, a league
in which a team relocated was likewise required to offer an expansion team to the
spurned community, which would then presumably make use of the reserved mark.96 In
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fact, this is precisely what occurred in the late 1990’s when the NFL’s Cleveland Browns
relocated to Baltimore but left their mark and colors in Cleveland. The Browns were
rechristened the Ravens and a few years thereafter Cleveland was awarded an expansion
franchise which assumed the Browns name and colors. However, this occurred through
contract rather than legislation; the FFCPA, like every other proposed bill, died in
committee.97
Regardless, even had these bills been passed into law, it is doubtful that they
would have had much effect on curbing out-of-market relocations due to the fact that
nearly every one of them rested upon the flawed premise that an antitrust exemption
would have had some teeth. In essence, these bills assumed that professional football,
basketball and hockey “leagues” were something other than simply an amalgam of team
owners, each of whom might want to relocate themselves one day. Therefore, as a
collective group, these leagues have been, even before Raiders I, hesitant to block
attempted relocations (absent the desire to hoist retribution upon a maverick owner) and,
as such, unable to police themselves.
In any event, as teams relocated and all four major leagues expanded throughout
the 1990’s, out-of-market relocations became less frequent as attractive open markets
became more scarce. Accordingly, the desire for legislation waned as the market seems
to have corrected itself, albeit to the detriment of city governments across the country,
without Congressional input. In the NFL, cities such as Nashville, Charlotte,
Jacksonville, Houston, St. Louis, Cleveland and Baltimore all received either relocated or
expansion franchises during the decade, leaving, by 2007, Los Angeles as perhaps the
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lone open market, albeit a powerful one, as a bargaining chip for NFL franchise owners
looking to better their current stadium leases. In Major League Baseball, the open
markets that have been used as bargaining chips for decades – Washington, D.C., Miami
and St. Petersburg, Florida likewise have been filled. Although those who argued against
Congressional intervention in out-of-market relocations were incorrect in their analysis –
as noted earlier, each of these cities wound up on the wrong end of extremely one-sided
and detrimental lease arrangements – the damage has, for the most part, been done and
there does not appear to be much left, outside of Los Angeles in the NFL, to inflict.
Legislation focusing on out-of-market relocations, even if properly focused, would be, at
this point, much too little and much too late.
Recent changes in professional sports economics likewise make the specter of
out-of-market relocations less common in the future. Commentators have correctly noted
that, traditionally, revenue sharing in the NFL, NBA, NHL and even to a lesser extent in
Major League Baseball, helped to make smaller cities more attractive as alternate
destinations and, as such, effective bargaining chips in the stadium lease negotiating
process.98 Because, historically, in the NFL at least, a team playing in Green Bay,
Wisconsin, could reap as much revenue as a team playing in New York, mid-size
metropolitan markets were considered reasonable destinations for any franchise with a
wandering eye -- the mid-1990’s relocation of the Rams from Los Angeles to St. Louis is
a prime example of this dynamic. Smaller cities such as the previously noted Charlotte,
looking to upgrade their image to “big league” status, have often been willing to be
overly generous in lease terms. Because the courted team could reap the benefits of these
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terms without suffering a loss of league revenue by downsizing to a smaller market, these
offers were obviously tantalizing.
Today, this is less true than ever before. Within roughly the past decade,
maximizing revenue depends more on those financial streams that are not subject to
revenue sharing than those that are. In particular, revenue generated from luxury box
sales and stadium naming rights are not subject to revenue sharing in the NFL and have,
as a consequence, become the Holy Grail for franchise owners seeking to maximize
profits. Although smaller cities may be able to provide 60,000 ravenous fans each
Sunday, all of this revenue goes into the league pot. They may be less able, due to a
smaller corporate presence, to fill the many dozens of luxury boxes demanded by team
owners in the course of lease negotiations or which would allow them to maximize
revenue from stadium naming rights, however. Therefore, a potential relocation from,
say, New York to Portland, Oregon may not be as attractive today as it might have been
even a decade ago.99 As the difference between playing in a large market and a smaller
one might be the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars available in non-shared revenue,
there is now a disincentive to this sort of downsizing.
In addition, there is television revenue to consider. In Major League Baseball,
smaller markets mean less revenue in local television deals. In the NFL, although buoyed
by network deals subject to revenue sharing, television revenue might decrease in the
aggregate if more and more teams relocate from larger markets to smaller ones. At some
99
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point, individual team owners might feel pressured by both their brethren as well as
network executives to reconsider abandoning large, lucrative markets such as Los
Angeles for smaller ones such as St. Louis. Although this certainly did not prevent the
Rams from doing exactly this, there conceivably may become a point, as the available
open cities become smaller and smaller due to expansion, where the pressure becomes
determinative. As Major League Baseball has expanded from 16 teams in 1960 to 30
teams today, and the NFL has expanded from 12 teams in 1959 to 32 teams today, it is
likely that these leagues are closer to this point than ever before. Given the above
economic realities, teams in large markets have a significant incentive to remain in their
current exclusive geographic regions rather than relocate to smaller ones. This does not
mean, however, that the potential for harm to cities has diminished. To the contrary,
franchises will continue to seek out the best possible deals for themselves in their never
ending quest for maximum profits. And they will increasingly look within their own
markets to do so.
IV. THE DYNAMICS AND HARM OF IN-MARKET RELOCATIONS
A. The Hidden Costs of In-Market Relocations
Historically, there have been significantly more in-market relocations than out-ofmarket ones. As stated earlier, at present there are many teams in all four major sports
that do not play within the legal limits of the geographic region for which they are
named. Regardless, none of the legislation proposed by Congress addressed these types
of relocations and, moreover, some of it expressly exempted in-market relocations from
their scope. In its original version, the Fan Freedom and Community Protection Act of
1995, by way of example, would not have applied to any relocation “in the case of a
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community with a professional sports team if the team relocates within 60 miles of the
community.”100 Later, the exception was narrowed to relocations of 25 miles or less.101
Still, most in-market relocations would not have been covered by the Act. The Sports
Antitrust Reform Act of 1996 defined a team’s “home territory” so as to coincide with a
franchise’s exclusive geographic region: “the term ‘home territory’ means the geographic
metropolitan area within which a member team operates and plays the majority of its
home games.”102 The Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1998 contained
identical language and further specified that the Act only applied when a franchise
proposed to play in a “new location” outside of its traditional “home territory.”103 Other
bills were similar in these regards.
As for the rationale behind the in-market exceptions carved out of these bills, one
can only speculate. However, given the atmosphere that led to their proposal, the
motivation behind the drafting of the specific language becomes more clear. These bills
were introduced, typically with great fanfare and haste, by members of Congress
representing the districts threatened with the loss of their home NFL teams. The potential
relocations giving rise to Congressional action were, without exception, out-of-market
ones. As such, the bills were an attempt to “keep… the home team at home” as one
commentator put it.104 By contrast, in-market relocations usually do not engender the
same sorts of emotional responses. Although, for example, residents of the city of Dallas
during the early 1970’s might have preferred to keep their Cowboys within the city
100
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limits, where they had played in the Cotton Bowl for nearly a decade, few could see the
harm of their short distance relocation to nearby Irving, Texas as it was much less overt.
Once the move was complete they would still be able to see their team on television
every Sunday and could still travel to games in nearby Texas Stadium to see them play in
person if they so desired. In the eyes of many, it was merely an instance of no harm, no
foul.
As this example illustrates, because the deprivation of allegiance of home town
fans is not at issue in these sorts of relocations, the emotional impact of in-market moves
is much less than that of out-of-market ones. Missing from the equation are the throngs
of yelling, crying, protesting fans barraging City Hall, dominating the local media and
stopping traffic as was the case in Cleveland when the Browns announced their move to
Baltimore. Without question, the potential relocation of the NBA’s Philadelphia 76’ers
and NHL’s Philadelphia Flyers to Camden, New Jersey set off a political rumble in the
early 1990’s. Fans of these teams, however, largely sat back and watched the drama
unfold, with interest but at a distance. In the end, they would still be able to see their
teams play and could still call them their own regardless of whether they ended up
playing in a new arena located in South Philadelphia or in one over the Walt Whitman
Bridge in nearby Camden. The harm inflicted by this battle, as is the case in every
potential in-market relocation, however, was no less severe despite its covert nature.
Although perhaps not as emotionally charged, many of the same abuses of
monopoly power nevertheless occur within the context of in-market relocations and in
some respects, are even more severe. Just as with the case of threatened out-of-market
relocations, sports franchises are able to extract sub-market rents and above-market lease
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concessions when they are able to pit city against nearby suburb or neighboring town in
the battle to win a stadium war. That the battle occurs within a single geographic region
may somewhat lessen the angst of the hometown fans but it nevertheless results in the
same one-sided leases that are considered so insidious when they occur in the out-ofmarket context. Moreover, given the changing economics of professional sports, these
in-market turf wars eliminate whatever leverage larger cities with established teams held
over their smaller, out-of-market rivals seeking to lure their teams away from them.
Now, by being able to remain within the same geographic region, franchises no longer
have to weigh the potential costs of relocating to a smaller region with perhaps a smaller
fan base and/or less of the corporate presence so necessary to the team’s ability to
maximize its luxury box and stadium naming rights revenue.
As has been demonstrated time and time again, sports franchises benefit in many
ways from their association with large cities even if they never set foot within their legal
boundaries. As stated earlier, it was the lure of the large market association that led
Arturo Moreno to shift his team’s association from the smaller Anaheim market to the
larger Los Angeles market in 2005.105 The potential increase in local television revenue
along with other marketing advantages drove the rechristening of the team despite the
fact that after the change, the team played in not only the same city it had for years, but
the same stadium as well. The team remained in place. Only the association changed.
And this was what mattered most to Moreno.106 Whether Moreno’s assumptions were
accurate is irrelevant. Economists can line up on either side of this issue but that does not
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change the reality that Moreno saw value in his team’s the association with Los Angeles
over Anaheim. Because he saw value in a particular association, this by itself gives that
association value. At that moment the association has become a commodity. Likewise, it
is the value of this commodity that more recently has driven the San Francisco 49’ers to
steadfastly maintain their San Francisco affiliation despite their imminent relocation 45
miles to the south.107 And as the law presently stands, this valuable asset is free for the
taking to anyone who wants it.
B. The True Beneficiaries of the City/Team Relationship
As for why cities have not fought harder, or in most cases at all, to seek value in
return for the benefits provided professional sports franchises (particularly ones who play
in-market but beyond city limits) through the use of their names, it is very likely that they
believe that they do indeed receive value through the affiliation. However, closer
analysis of this presumed value reveals that it is illusory.
Historically, whenever city representatives are called upon to justify the one-sided
leases, free land, tax breaks and public money used to lure or keep a professional sports
team, they invariably resort to the “big league” status these teams supposedly confer upon
their affiliated cities discussed herein in section III(b)(ii). According to this rationale,
these benefits accrue even when the city loses the stadium battle so long as it loses to an
in-market rival. Thus, as the theory goes, the use of its name confers value upon the city
regardless of the fact that the team does not actually play there. However, although, for
example, city leaders may have worried that the departure of MLB’s Cardinals would
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turn their city into “another Omaha,”108 in reality, it was the Cardinals who required the
association with a large city such as St. Louis as much or perhaps even more.
In truth, the four major professional sports leagues are under just as much
pressure as cities to maintain or enhance their “big time” status. Without it, local and
national television revenue, among other things, would most likely decrease significantly.
Consider the NFL, for example: one wonders if the same billions of dollars would be
heaped upon the league by large broadcast and cable networks if the league was
populated with the likes of the Irving Cowboys, East Rutherford Giants, Orchard Park
Bills, Landover Redskins and Santa Clara 49’ers rather than the major cities with which
these teams are currently associated. In fact, such a league harkens back to the early days
of the NFL, when the league fought to overcome its second class status perpetuated, at
least in part, from the small towns which flew the nascent league’s banner.
At the time of the formation of the NFL, Major League Baseball ruled the
American professional sports world with teams located in every major east coast and
midwestern city. While baseball could legitimately call itself the country’s national
pastime with teams representing cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Washington,
Boston, Chicago, St. Louis and Detroit, the NFL was populated with teams representing
burgs such as Canton, Toledo, Rock Island, Racine, Dayton, Evansville and, of all places,
LaRue, Ohio (The Ooring Indians who were named after a local dog kennel).109 It did
not take much to conclude that, compared to Major League Baseball, the NFL was small
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time and minor league. Other than Chicago, the NFL lacked status because it lacked
affiliation with what were then America’s “big time” cities. As the league strove for
legitimacy, it dropped its affiliation with these smaller locales and developed ones with
larger ones. And in at least one instance, this process presaged Moreno’s re-branding of
his Angels.
i. The Frankford Yellow Jackets
In 1924, after a successful stint barnstorming against NFL teams, the Frankford
Yellow Jackets, a team located in a North Philadelphia neighborhood, were granted entry
into the league.110 Although a good and soon-to-be great team, the Yellow Jackets, like
most teams in the league, often failed to draw much of a crowd or much exposure in the
press: high school football typically was more heavily covered.111 In their initial season,
the team went 11-2-1 in NFL league play (and 17-3-1 overall; teams were permitted to
play games against opponents outside of the league) and in 1925 were once again a top
team. Regardless, the provincialism created by the Frankford affiliation continued to
haunt the team as it was not widely accepted by the larger geographic region.112 In 1926,
an upstart league, the AFL (American Football League) was formed and soon, the Yellow
Jackets had a rival in the Philadelphia Quakers. Despite being the more established team
in the more established league (and a great team at that: the Yellow Jackets would win
the 1926 NFL Championship), the Yellow Jackets were routinely outdrawn by the
Quakers even though both teams played some of their games in the same stadium:
Philadelphia’s Shibe Park. By 1931, with the team foundering due to lack of support, a
110
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push was made by some in the local sports media to help stir up interest in the team by
unofficially rechristening it the Philadelphia Yellow Jackets.113 But by then it was too
late: the Yellow Jackets folded due to lack of support from the Philadelphia sporting
public.114
Two years later, in 1933, the franchise’s league license was sold to a new owner,
Bert Bell, who was not about to recreate the mistake made when the franchise was born.
This time, in a shift of allegiances echoed by Moreno over 70 years later, the team’s
geographic association would be more broad: Philadelphia. Hence, the Philadelphia
Eagles, a team playing under the same league license originally awarded to the Frankford
Yellow Jackets, were born and very quickly became the city’s team rather than the
representative of one small part of it.115 Across the league, as the decades passed, similar
changes were taking place: small burgs were abandoned in favor of large cities. By the
early 1970’s, the NFL would have teams in every city that also hosted an MLB team. At
this point, no one could reasonably deny the NFL’s claim that it was a “big time” league
at last; equal to Major League Baseball in every detail. As for who benefited more from
the marriage of city to team, one could take either side. However, it is likely that the
league, and therefore the individual teams that comprise it, realized significant benefits in
status and, as a result, financially. As this example illustrates, sports franchises require
the association with large cities perhaps as much, if not more, than cities need the
franchises. In any event, it is, at a minimum, the proverbial two-way street in this regard.
ii. The Effect of Current Law: A Lose-Lose Proposition
for Cities Negotiating With Professional Sports Franchises
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None of this is to suggest that the NFL would return to the bygone, barnstorming
era of the Frankford Yellow Jackets and Oorang Indians without its affiliation with large
cities. However, it seems fair to question whether its image, and therefore its financial
power, would suffer, at least somewhat, without them. Perhaps network television deals
would be smaller by a few degrees, and stadium naming rights contracts slightly less
lucrative, if the league’s geographic designations were downsized. If in fact this would
be the case, and it seems reasonable to assume that it would, then there exists a value to
professional sports franchises’ geographic association with large cities. As such, inmarket relocations ultimately harm these cities in that the relocated team is able to profit
off of the association for free; the shunned city receives nothing for the valuable use of its
name.
Viewed in this light, cities are harmed whenever a team even threatens an inmarket relocation: if they “win” by outbidding a rival suburb, they really lose due to the
sub-market rents and above-market lease concessions they are forced to offer in order to
woo the team looking to maximize its profit; if they lose the bidding and the team, they
lose even more through the uncompensated use of their name by the abandoning team.
Thus, as the law currently stands, because there is no cost to a team that relocates inmarket (it reaps the fruit of the bidding war between city and suburb, knowing that
regardless of who wins, it will be able to maintain its valuable association with the city)
cities are, in effect, paying a premium (through these unfavorable leases) for the team’s
ability to freely use its name. As this result is absurd, legal protection to cities to prevent
this dynamic is necessary. For if any party should pay a premium for the use of the city’s
name, it is the team that profits from it, not the city harmed by it.
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The situation outlined above is not a rare or contrived one. In fact, it is quite
common and is likely to become even more commonplace in the future as in-market
relocations become even more favored than they are now. Through rapid expansion and
the frequent out-of-market relocations of the 1990’s, available large markets have
become scarce. The changing economics of professional sports, particularly within the
NFL, discussed above, likewise has made smaller markets less attractive than they were
previously. In Jacksonville, for example, the NFL’s vision of revenue sharing utopia
came crashing down when it was revealed in 2007 that despite the common pool, the
Jaguars lost money due to the fact that the small corporate presence in Jacksonville has
made it exceedingly difficult for the team to secure new naming rights for its stadium.
The New Orleans Saints experienced similar problems even pre-Hurricane Katrina,
resulting in yet another struggling mid-market franchise due to a lack of what is now
considered a necessary stream of revenue. Accordingly, in the future, teams looking to
better their financial lot may think twice before abandoning a large market for a smaller
one. Although this should, in theory, lead to a reduction of bargaining leverage on behalf
of the franchises, the ever-availability of no-cost in-market relocations restores it in
practice.
Without legal recognition of the changing realities of the team/city relationship,
this practice will continue unabated into the future as the in-market suburbs will always
be available to serve as no-cost bargaining chips for teams looking to maximize profits at
the expense of their home towns. The concept of geographic exclusivity guarantees this
reality. Moreover, with the disappearance and decreasing allure of available out-ofmarket cities, in-market battles represent the best-case scenario from the perspective of
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many teams now and into the future in that they allow teams to maximize revenue while
maintaining their fan base. As such, the risks, such as they are, presented by out-ofmarket moves are non-existent here. If however, cities were afforded limited property
rights to their names, the inequalities presented within the in-market relocation battle
disappear. Section V examines the form and scope of such a right.
V. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity is “the right of every person to control the commercial use
of his or her identity.”116 More specifically, it gives the individual the right to prevent or,
for a fee, permit the use of his or her identity in such a way that benefits someone else
commercially.117 As such, it allows the individual to receive value in exchange for
another’s use of the name for commercial purposes.118 In this regard, it is not unlike a
form of property right.119 It is also, however, not unlike a privacy right when it is used to
prevent the unauthorized use of one’s name. First formally recognized in the Second
Circuit’s 1953 Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,120 opinion
(coincidentally, a case that likewise dealt with sports law issues), it is a right that, at its
core, borrows from both but ultimately stands independent of each. Although right of
publicity cases typically involve celebrities (as their names carry the most value), the
right applies to everyone, providing that they are flesh and blood human beings;
corporations, treated as individuals in most other ways under the law, cannot avail
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themselves of this right.121 Neither can geographic identities such as cities or famous
landmarks, although as discussed below, consideration has been given in some contexts
to readdressing this limitation. Until recently, the right of publicity has been one that
falls under state rather than federal law.122 Just over half of the states provide for such a
right, with the majority of these providing so via statute.123
A. The ACPA
In 1999, however, a limited form of this right was arguably codified in the federal
Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (the “ACPA”).124 In order to prevent
improper profiteering with regard to Internet domain names, much of the ACPA targets
registered names that are confusingly similar to famous marks. As the Sixth Circuit in
Ford Motor Co. v. Catalanotte held, “[r]egistering a famous trademark as a domain name
and then offering it for sale to the trademark owner is exactly the wrong Congress
intended to remedy when it passed the ACPA.”125 Accordingly, it was added to the
federal Lanham Act in order to protect these trademark owners and is triggered whenever
someone “‘registers, traffics in or uses’ an offending domain name.”126 Before it was
passed, however, at the 11th hour, the ACPA was amended to also include protection
against the use of non-trademarked personal names for the purpose of profiteering. This
“personal name” protection legislation was ultimately codified in section 3001(b) of Title
III which itself was contained within the Intellectual Property and Communications
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Omnibus Reform Act of 1999.127 The protection afforded under this provision is quite
limited and specific and is thought to be, by at least some commentators, perhaps the first
federal codification of at least a limited right of publicity, regardless of Congress’s
protestations to the contrary:
In sum, this subsection is a narrow provision intended to curtail one form of
“cybersquatting” – the act of registering someone else’s name as a domain name
for the purpose of demanding remuneration from the person in exchange for the
domain name. Neither this section nor any other section in this bill is intended to
create a right of publicity of any kind with respect to domain names.128
Pursuant to the personal name provision, whenever someone registers a name with the
intent to profit off of it, liability is triggered (in the form of injunctive relief; money
damages are not available) even though the individual harmed does not otherwise have a
recognized legal right to their name, such as in the case of cybersquatted trademarks.129
It is for this reason that some commentators believe that a federal right of publicity has
been created notwithstanding the above congressional clarification.130
If it is not a right of publicity, it is difficult to grasp what, then, it is, as the
elements of the federal statutory claim are substantially similar to the generally
recognized elements of a right of publicity claim. Under both, four elements need to be
proven: (1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of the
127
J. Thomas McCarthy, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:80 (4th
ed. 2006). Technically, it is not part of the Lanham Act and is found instead in 15 U.S.C. § 1129.
128
Senate Section-by-Section Analysis, Congressional Record, p. S14715 (November 17, 1999), quoted in
J. Thomas McCarthy, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:80 (4th ed.
2006).
129
Pursuant to the ACPA, “a court may award injunctive relief, including the forfeiture or cancellation of
the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the plaintiff. The court may also, in its discretion,
award costs and attorneys fees to the prevailing party.” J. Thomas McCarthy, McCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:80 (4th ed. 2006).
130
See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain Name Disputes Past Trademark
Policy, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1361, 1420. Lipton noted that, like the right of publicity, the federally
created right sounds similar to a property right as well as a privacy right. See also Neil L. Martin, Note,
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: Empowering Trademark Owners, But Not the Last Word
on Domain Name Disputes, 25 J. Corp. L. 591, 605 (2000). “Despite Congress’ claim to the contrary,
section 3002(b) creates an action that resembles a right of publicity claim.”

39

plaintiff’s name or likeness to the defendant’s commercial advantage; (3) lack of consent;
and (4) resulting injury.131 The federal claim may provide a somewhat more vigorous
challenge to those seeking to fall under its protection in that it requires specific intent on
behalf of the defendant to profit from the use of the plaintiff’s name but in all other
respects, the elements are virtually identical.132 (Non-celebrity plaintiffs might also face
a steep practical challenge in succeeding under the ACPA in that numerous cases
considering this provision of the Act have likewise required the plaintiff to prove that his
or her name is famous or distinctive such that it has developed a secondary meaning.
Non-celebrities would have a difficult time establishing the existence of a secondary
meaning of an indistinct name).133 That the two are so closely related is only natural in
that, on a larger scale, the Lanham Act itself is considered by some practitioners to be a
close relative of the right of publicity.134 The personal name protection section of the
ACPA might simply be the most explicit example of this reality.
Like the state law right of publicity, the personal name provision of the ACPA
presently applies only to flesh and blood human beings. Recently, however, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), a domain name dispute resolution
organization accredited by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(“ICANN”) which itself is a private entity charged with the responsibility of managing
and coordinating the domain name system by overseeing the distribution of Internet
addresses and domain names, has begun to consider the feasibility of an expansion of the
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protection of identities beyond personal names.135 For just as with the case of the
appropriation of an individual’s name for commercial purpose, culturally significant
names and geographic locations are similarly at risk for abuse by profiteers.136 The
Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process suggested further
consideration of the issue, indicating increasing awareness of the issues that arise
whenever an individual or entity attempts to profit off of the name of someone or
something else.137
Certainly, protection, under the ACPA or, more generally, pursuant to the right of
publicity, of culturally significant names and geographic locations presents unique
challenges. For example, deciding which group has the strongest legal interest in, say,
the Grand Canyon, and which therefore would be able to seek legal protection from
profiteers might be difficult to establish: “the social and cultural norms that might be
protected by granting legal rights in these names are probably harder to establish with any
degree of certainty that those that might be protected with respect to trademarks and
personal names.”138 A more limited right, however, one which extends no further than to
the protection of legally recognized geographic identities such as states, cities and
incorporated political subdivisions would be much easier to administer. Further, the
failure to recognize these rights results in real and identifiable harm. Without action on
this issue soon, “commercial interests…will come to dominate all law and policy as it
applies to domain names. It is possible that very real interests are being overlooked and
will continue to be overlooked, unless the debate is refocused to take account of some of
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these issues.”139 As the trampling of interests within the context of in-market sports
franchise relocations attests, this is likewise true outside of the realm of the Internet and
beyond the scope of the ACPA.
B. Beyond the ACPA
The discussion currently taking place within WIPO and the expansion of the
ACPA to include protection for personal names indicates the growing concern for the
protection of identities of many different types, at least within the parameters of the
Internet. Now that Congress has taken its furthest step yet in establishing a limited
federal right of publicity, it perhaps is time for it to consider similar harms suffered
outside of the realm of cyberspace -- by cities whenever their names are appropriated by
professional sports teams that threaten to relocate in-market. Once equipped with this
right, cities will then be able to engage in fair and level negotiations with sports
franchises seeking new stadiums or renegotiated lease terms. Just as the right of publicity
and the ACPA level the proverbial playing field by requiring an individual seeking to use
another’s name to pay for the privilege of doing so, the financial burden with regard to
in-market relocations will be placed on the appropriate party as well: the one seeking to
use the name rather than the one whose name is being used.140
Doing so would not mean that teams such as the NFL’s 49’ers could not call
themselves the San Francisco 49’ers should they choose to relocate to Santa Clara.
Instead, it simply recognizes the reality that the team receives some benefit from the
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association with San Francisco and provides the city with the opportunity to be fairly
compensated for the benefits that run to the team as a result of its use of the city’s name.
In sum, the creation of this limited right of publicity creates a market for a city’s name in
which its value can be fairly and equitably determined through the bargaining process.
Once this is determined, the team would then have a choice: pay a fee to the city for the
use of its name or forego the association. For the first time, cities would be able to
adequately protect the interest of their citizens when negotiating lease provisions with
professional sports teams. This may be the only way for them to do so; without this right,
the monopoly power of professional sports leagues, as wielded through the powerful tool
of geographic exclusivity, puts cities at their mercy.
Lawyers, economists, public officials, team owners may all disagree about the
value of a team’s association with a particular city, or even whether there is any value to
this at all, but without this right, all such debates are purely in the abstract. Not until the
association is offered up for negotiation does anybody truly know how much the San
Francisco association means to the 49’ers. Moreover, commodifying a city’s name for
this limited purpose may very well lead to widely different results, depending on the
particulars of each individual negotiation. For example, in recent years, Baltimore
Orioles owner Peter Angelos demonstrated a weak commitment to his team’s association
with the city of Baltimore as he attempted to broaden the team’s fan base beyond the near
suburbs and into Washington, D.C. and Northern Virginia.141 To this end, he had the
name “Baltimore” removed from both his team’s home and road uniforms.142 One
suspects that if he were to consider an in-market relocation beyond the Baltimore city
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limit, he would not pay much, if anything, to maintain his team’s Baltimore association
(although the subsequent relocation of the Montreal Expos to Washington may have
changed his thinking). On the other side of the negotiating table, San Diego’s mayor has
publicly stated that he would like the NFL’s Chargers to retain their San Diego affiliation
even should they relocate from the city to another location within San Diego County.143
Under this scenario, it is likely that the association would be offered up to the team for
little or no cost. (Given the lack of options presently available to the city, however, the
mayor’s statement is not surprising; one suspects that he might place more of a value on
his city’s name if the prospect of remuneration was on the bargaining table.)
In situations where a team values the association and a city is determined to
protect it, however, the fee would be higher and would, just as in the Baltimore and San
Diego examples, reflect the perceived value of the association. Returning to Arturo
Moreno and his Angels, although this limited right of publicity would not have directly
affected the city of Anaheim, it would nevertheless have played an important role in the
resolution of the issue. Very likely, the city of Los Angeles – Moreno’s desired
geographic affiliation – would have recognized the value of the affiliation to Moreno and
offered it up for a substantial fee. At that point Moreno would have been presented with
a choice: pay a high fee for the perceived value the Los Angeles affiliation brings to his
team or no fee to maintain the less valuable Anaheim association. Such a choice would
represent the realities of in-market relocations or, in this unique example, in-market
affiliation relocations. Each party is compelled to weigh the costs and benefits of such
relocations and act accordingly. Through this process, the rights of each party are
properly expressed and protected.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Establishing a limited right of publicity, as outlined above, effectively prevents
the continuation of professional sports teams’ abuse of their monopoly power by pitting
city against suburb in stadium lease negotiations. This right recognizes the inherent value
in the affiliation of city and team and forces teams to acknowledge the value they receive
whenever they take the field in the name of these cities. Should these teams find their
current stadiums or lease arrangements insufficient, negotiations would then occur on an
even playing field, with city, competing suburb, and professional sports franchise all able
and compelled to weigh the true costs and benefits of a potential in-market relocation.
One-sided leases with below-market rents and above-market perks would become less
frequent in this scenario given the value placed on the large market affiliation. Perhaps a
more affluent, more spacious suburb can offer land more cheaply than its nearby city.
Recognizing and commodifying the value of the city affiliation enables cities to compete
in this market by means other than by offering financially imprudent lease terms which
thereby damage their taxpayers.
The true cost of in-market relocations would be recognized as television networks
would perhaps put pressure on teams to maintain their large city affiliations through
threats of financially reduced broadcast packages should these affiliations disappear.
Leagues as well might, at some point, exert similar pressure in recognition of the reality
that their “big league” status depends in no small part on their teams’ affiliation with
large cities rather than small, unknown geographic locations. All of these forces would
be at work whenever a team enters negotiations with a city over the terms of a stadium
lease. For the first time, it would be the city and not the team which would wield the
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hammer at the bargaining table, regardless of professional sports’ monopoly power and
resultant geographic exclusivity. Because of the increased bargaining power of cities,
stadium deals would more truly reflect the interests of the public than ever before as they
would properly consider the attendant costs and benefits associated with a professional
sports team’s playing its games in one particular geographic location rather than another.
What’s in a name? For the first time, negotiators on both sides of the bargaining table
would find out definitively.
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